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Abstract
Introduction: Informal patient payments for healthcare are common in the Western Balkans, negatively affecting 
public health and healthcare. 
Aim: To identify literature from the Western Balkans on what is known about informal patient payments and bought 
and brought goods, to examine their effects on healthcare and to determine what actions can be taken to tackle these 
payments. 
Methods: After conducting a scoping review that involved searching websites and databases and filtering with eligibility 
criteria and quality assessment tools, 24 relevant studies were revealed. The data were synthesized using a narrative 
approach that identified key concepts, types of evidence, and research gaps. 
Results: The number of studies of informal patient payments increased between 2002 and 2015, but evidence regarding 
the issues of concern is scattered across various countries. Research has reported incidents of informal patient payments 
on a wide scale and has described various patterns and characteristics of these payments. Although these payments have 
typically been small – particularly to providers in common areas of specialized medicine – evidence regarding bought 
and brought goods remains limited, indicating that such practices are likely even more common, of greater magnitude 
and perhaps more problematic than informal patient payments. Only scant research has examined the measures 
that are used to tackle informal patient payments. The evidence indicates that legalizing informal patient payments, 
introducing performance-based payment systems, strengthening reporting, changing mentalities and involving the 
media and the European Union (EU) or religious organizations in anti-corruption campaigns are understood as some 
of the possible remedies that might help reduce informal patient payments. 
Conclusion: Despite comprehensive evidence regarding informal patient payments, data remain scattered and 
contradictory, implying that informal patient payments are a complex phenomenon. Additionally, the data on bought 
and brought goods illustrate that not much is known about this matter. Although informal patient payments have 
been studied and described in several settings, there is still little research on the effectiveness of such strategies in the 
Western Balkans context.
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Introduction
Informal patient payments for healthcare are common in 
Central, Eastern and Southern European countries.1-5 In 
the early transition from communist countries, this region 
experienced a decline in economic production, reducing 
the capacity of government spending on health.6 In the 
aftermath of the break-up of Yugoslavia, most of the Western 
Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM], 
Montenegro and Serbia) introduced a social insurance system 
and increased out-of-pocket (OOP) payments to finance 
health care,7 facilitating both formal and informal patient 
payments. Such increase in private OOP spending, creates 
a wider network of providers and increases accessibility, but 
makes paying difficult for some vulnerable groups. On the 
contrary, publicly financed health care protects the population 
from financial risks by providing not for profit and affordable 
health care, that everyone is eligible to.8 Though such 
accessibility may be limited in terms of long waiting lists and 
eligibility criteria (citizenship, age etc). 
Informal patient payments are conceptually part of the 
broader term ‘OOP payments,’ which is defined as “private 
health expenditure paid directly by individuals to health care 
providers when in contact with the health care system.”8,9 
Countries with fewer resources for public health spending 
often experience growth in private (formal or informal) OOP 
payments, shifting the costs to the health consumers.10 It is 
likely that most private spending takes the place of informal 
patient payments,11 due to underfunded, ineffective and poorly 
functioning (public) health care systems. OOP payments 
vary among countries, but a strong relationship is observed 
between the level of OOP payments for health and the extent 
of catastrophic and impoverishing health expenditures in a 
country, generating problems of financial protection of the 
population.8,10 
Informal patient payment is defined as “a direct contribution, 
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which is made in addition to any contribution determined by 
the terms of entitlement, in cash or in-kind (gratitude gift), 
by patients or others acting on their behalf, to healthcare 
providers for services that the patients are entitled to.”12 
The payments may be in the form of flowers, sweets, small 
tips or large sums of cash.12 By definition, informal patient 
payments also include bought and brought goods, although 
the two terms differ in practice because ‘bought and brought 
goods’ involve payment for goods (such as pharmaceuticals, 
bed linen, materials or equipment) that patients are requested 
to bring with them when seeking healthcare.12,13 Bought 
and brought goods are therefore not counter-favors but are 
brought by patients as part of the process of seeking required 
service delivery. A distinction should be made between 
goods (products) and services (assistance or advice) in health 
care, as different practices exist around paying for services 
or providing goods that one is entitled for. As it is now, the 
term ‘informal patient payments’ includes in kind gifts or 
bribery and bought and brought goods. This study separates 
these two terms because bought and brought goods are not as 
recognized as informal patient payments.14 The present study 
will therefore give a more nuanced and clearer distinction of 
the research available in this field.
OOP payments are important to examine due to the financial 
risk that these pose on vulnerable groups.15 Data from 6 of the 
Western Balkan countries (not including Kosovo) indicate that 
public health expenditure[1] accounts for approximately 50%-
80%, where Albania has the lowest public health expenditure 
and Croatia the highest.16 OOP spending is therefore quite 
high in some Western Balkan countries, particularly in 
Albania and Montenegro. Prior research suggests that OOP 
payments – including informal patient payments and bought 
and brought goods – negatively affect public health, access to 
healthcare and health equity.17,18 These payments may further 
lead consumers to curtail their use of health services, affecting 
poorer social groups, in particular.15 Especially informal 
patient payments are necessary to study since patients often 
mistakenly perceive informal patient payments as official 
fees, and they may therefore be difficult to capture.19 Because 
of such payments, it has been difficult to precisely estimate 
expenditures for healthcare services in affected areas. In 
the seven Western Balkan countries, healthcare is publicly 
financed by the income tax system. Formal and private OOP 
payments are an additional source of funding in these health 
systems, although informal patient payments and bought and 
brought goods may inflate them further.20 
The Euro Health Consumer Powerhouse21 ranked the 
performance of European health systems performance in 
2015 using 48 indicators. Of 35 European countries, the 
Western Balkan healthcare systems ranked from lowest to 
intermediate levels of performance, with Montenegro at the 
bottom. Bosnia and Herzegovina was not included in this 
edition, due to an inability to furnish reliable data.21 One 
explanation for the poor performance in these countries may 
be found in Transparency International’s (TI)22 Corruption 
Perception Index, which ranked the countries comprising 
the Western Balkans from 64th to 110th out of 177 countries 
in terms of the level of corruption [an overall perception of 
corruption that included not just healthcare but all public 
sectors]. 
In most Western Balkan countries, anti-corruption laws 
prohibit providers from receiving informal patient payments, 
such as gifts and bribes (eg, in Albania and Serbia23,24). 
However, enforcement of these laws is weak and inefficient 
in these countries, resulting in minimal legislative impact 
on corruption.25,26 Even Croatia, the lone Western Balkan 
country in the European Union (EU), continues to struggle 
with bribes in the form of gifts. Although bribery is illegal, 
gifts are legal in Croatia based on their value and intent, 
which leads to the use of gifts as bribes.27 
Objectives of the Study
This study aims to answer the following research questions: 
• For Western Balkan countries, what is known about 
informal patient payments and bought and brought 
goods and their effects on healthcare systems over the 
past 13 years?
• What actions can be taken to tackle this problem?
As there are no governmental regulations that specifically 
cover ‘bought and brought goods,’ the practices involving them 
typically do not contravene established laws or regulations. 
Further, this issue has not been tackled by policy-makers.28 
However, according to living standard measurement surveys 
in Albania,29 for example, services and drugs that should be 
provided for free are often paid for by patients. The existence 
of informal patient payments thus warrants examination, 
particularly because Western Balkan countries are beginning 
to apply to and join the EU. As Ahrens30 argues, the existence 
of informal patient payments is a sign of poor governance 
that may hamper these countries’ transition into the EU. The 
present review is among the few that considers both bought 
and brought goods, informal patient payments and measures 
to tackle these payments and goods. Further, the review 
distinctively compares all 7 Western Balkan countries in 
terms of these three issues. 
In the coming sections, a detailed methodological description 
is presented, together with an illustration of the identification 
of papers and a quality assessment of the findings. 
Methods
We conducted a scoping review to map the state of the 
literature in the area of concern. A scoping review, which has 
been previously described by Arksey and O’Malley,31 is a form 
of knowledge synthesis that addresses an exploratory research 
question and aims to map key concepts, types of evidence, 
and gaps in research that are related to a defined field.32 
Levac et al,33 Daudt et al,34 and Colquhoun et al32 address the 
strengths and limitations of scoping review methodology and 
encourage consistency in methods across scoping studies. 
The present review is based on the scoping review framework 
developed by Levac et al33 and Daudt et al.34
Search Strategy
The search process was iterative, and it continuously included 
and excluded studies and redefined search terms in the 
process of becoming familiar with the literature. Therefore, 
the steps of phrasing the research question, searching and 
selecting relevant published and grey literature was repeated 
to ensure the comprehensiveness of the evidence. 
The main search terms that were used included “health 
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systems,” “Western Balkan” and “informal payments.” 
These included a total of 99 sub-keywords connected with 
the Boolean operator OR. The sub-keywords were for 
example “health governance,” “healthcare system,” “health 
professional” or “Western Balkan” or individual countries, eg, 
“Serbia,” “Croatia.” Sub-keywords for “informal payments” 
were terms such as “informal payment,” “bribe,” “drug,” 
“goods,” “cash” or “gift.” The term bought and brought goods 
was not included in the search terms, since this term is rarely 
used in scientific literature. All three of the keyword themes 
were initially searched separately in PubMed, CINAHL, 
Web of Science, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts and 
Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts. A combined 
search of the separate searches was then completed with the 
Boolean operator AND. The following specific journals that 
typically provide information on informal patient payments 
or healthcare governance were manually searched: the 
Journal of Public Health, The Slavonic and East European 
Review, Health Policy and the International Journal of 
Healthcare, Insurance and Equity. Searches were also 
completed at the websites of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), the 
United Nations Office of Drug and Crime (UNODC), the 
UN Development Programme (UNDP), the EU and all the 
Western Balkan Institutes of Public Health. The public health 
institutes’ websites in Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina were in the local language and not in English, 
and it was therefore not possible to complete searches at these 
websites. Publication bias35 is therefore a risk because there 
may be valuable information at these websites that remains 
undiscovered.
Selection of Studies
A study was included based on the following criteria: the 
study relates to one or more Western Balkan countries; it is 
a primary study that addresses the issue of informal patient 
payments or bought an brought goods (voluntary or forced 
gifts, unofficial cash payments or illegitimate goods bought 
and brought by patients to hospitals or clinics); it is written in 
English; and it uses data from the 2002–2015 period. Exclusion 
was based on duplication or a failure to fulfill the inclusion 
criteria. Papers addressing suggestions to tackle informal 
patient payments were identified when extracting the data 
and were therefore not an inclusion criterion. A total of 3319 
studies were initially identified; of these, 3068 remained for 
title screening after 251 duplicates were excluded in EndNote 
(Figure). The title screening excluded 2870 studies based 
on the inclusion criteria, including 198 papers for abstract 
screening. Of these, 127 were excluded based on the inclusion 
criteria, and 71 were included after the articles were read in 
full-text. An assessment against the inclusion criteria was 
carried out, which resulted in the rejection of 38 studies that 
were not relevant to the research question. The 33 remaining 
papers were assessed for their quality using tools from the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE).36 
Different tools were used for qualitative, quantitative and 
intervention studies. Nine studies were rejected due to poor 
quality, which left 24 studies with good (++) to moderate (+) 
quality for the final synthesis.
Data Extraction and Synthesis Methods
The data that were relevant to the research question from the 
24 included papers were extracted from the texts and saved in 
an Excel sheet. Data extraction was repeatedly complemented 
until it was found to be satisfactory. 
The synthesis of evidence was performed based on the 
thematic synthesis method developed by Thomas and 
Harden.37 The authors describe the process of a thematic 
analysis comprising three stages: free coding of the primary 
studies, organizing the codes in descriptive themes and 
developing analytical themes to integrate the findings of 
multiple studies. The results were also explained in a narrative 
manner. Coding the text (both narratives and numbers) and 
dividing it into preliminary descriptive themes was completed 
in Excel. The preliminary themes were then operationalized 
into analytical themes that directly addressed the research 
questions of the review. These analytical themes extended 
beyond the preliminary findings and generated additional 
understandings or hypotheses.37 The analytical themes were 
identified to answer the posited research questions through 
the judgments and insights of the researchers with regard to 
the results. The preliminary descriptive themes were outlined 
on paper (not in Excel) to facilitate comprehension of the 
data. Next, lacking evidence was considered, and remedies 
as well as respondents’ perceptions and attitudes towards 
informal patient payments and bought and brought goods 
were described. After describing the studies, these analytical 
themes will structure the findings section.
Grading Evidence
The review findings were assessed for confidence based on 
the Confidence of the Evidence from Reviews of Qualitative 
Research (CERQual).38 Although it is a qualitative tool, 
the researchers found that it functioned well in grading 
qualitative, quantitative and mixed method studies because 
a narrative approach was taken to synthesize findings and 
draw conclusions from the included studies. The grading 
consisted of four components: methodological limitations, 
relevance, coherence and adequacy.38 These four components 
were operationalized into an overall assessment of the 
levels of confidence in evidence: high, moderate, low or 
very low. Because the CERQual tool was used before 
recognizing the analytical themes of the thematic synthesis 
method, the assessment is based on the preliminary 
descriptive themes.
In terms of the methodological limitations of the three types 
of studies (quantitative, qualitative or mixed methods), 
these were graded minor, moderate or substantial concerns 
due to the three levels of assessment (-/+/++) in the NICE 
methodological assessment tool. Studies were primarily 
graded as either minor or moderate. Studies with substantial 
methodological limitations, such as poor representation 
of the source population or lacking reporting of evidence, 
were excluded. Methodological considerations within the 
reviews mainly involved minor concerns regarding validity or 
the inclusion of too few participants in the studies (mostly 
qualitative studies), whereas saturation of data may not have 
been fulfilled. Findings are however reliable and policy makers 
and users of the review may place reasonable emphasis on 
these findings.
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Results
General Description of Studies
The 24 included publications consisted of 17 articles in 
scientific journals, four reports, two master’s theses and one 
working paper, all of which were published between 2002 and 
2015. The fieldwork that is reported in these publications had 
taken place between 2002 and 2014. The sampling area varied 
from districts, municipalities, cities and towns to general 
populations in a single country and in multiple countries. 
Moreover, informal patient payments – and to some extent 
bought and brought goods in healthcare – were mostly 
examined from the perspective of the general public because 
several of the studies included data from surveys, particularly 
surveys that measured living standards. The sample sizes 
also varied: nine of the 24 studies included samples that 
were larger than 10 000; in 10 of the studies, the sample sizes 
were between 100 and 8000; and five of the studies included 
fewer than 99 respondents. Respondents were not the only 
source of data, as two of the studies supplemented their 
data with a literature review, including governmental and 
non-governmental literature such as government decisions, 
legislation, books and journals. 
Seven of the studies were cross-national, whereas the 
remaining 17 studies were focused on a single country. 
Research on informal patient payments was found in all 
the Western Balkan countries, including the following: 
Albania (14), Serbia (9), Kosovo (7), FYROM (6), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (5), Croatia (5) and Montenegro (4). However, 
research on bought and brought goods was conducted only in 
Serbia. Other studies mention these practices with concrete 
names such as ‘paying for drugs’ or ‘paying for an epidural 
analgesia’ or ‘paying for the provision of a bed.’ The data on 
bought and brought goods were thin or unclear in Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM (Table).
Definitions and Measures of Informal Patient Payments
Most of the included studies defined in their papers informal 
patient payments as being either voluntary or forced payments 
or gifts to healthcare professionals. Other studies (#16,#18,#19) 
inexplicitly described informal patient payments as unofficial 
fees to health staff and used terms such as ‘corruption to 
healthcare staff ’ or ‘bribes to public health officials.’ Several 
Figure. PRISMA Diagram of Included and Excluded Literature. Abbreviation: NICE, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence.
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No/Ref Country Sample Size Focus and Aim Setting Type Qual.Score Main Findings Described Effects Perceptions on Interventions
(1) Arsenijevic 
et al, 2015
SER 17 375
Evidence on bought 
and brought goods, 
formal and informal 
patient payments in 
the public healthcare
General pop. 
single country
Quant ++
Only about 5% of healthcare users report informal patient 
payments, whereas around 60% report paying bought and 
brought goods.
Payments for bought and brought goods 
present the highest share in the annual 
household consumption per household 
member. The burden is minor for informal 
patient payments. Rural residents, poorer 
and non-married report more payments 
for bought and brought goods. Young and 
more educated report more informal patient 
payments.
(2) Arsenijevic 
et al, 2014a SER 45 127
OOP payments for in- 
and outpatient care by 
exempted groups
General pop. 
single country
Quant +
All population groups report informal patient payments 
in 2002, 2003, and 2007. OOP payments (formal, informal 
and bought and brought goods) in exempt groups (elderly, 
children, unemployed, disabled, poor) are less frequently 
reported for outpatient care than for inpatient services, 
except for the year 2007.
Elderly and patients with low income pay 
more for pharmaceuticals, disposable 
materials and orthopedic devices brought by 
patients to the hospital than other population 
group.
(3) Arsenijevic 
et al, 2014b
SER 657
Quality and access 
indicators and patient 
payments for maternity 
care in Serbia
Maternity 
patients, 
District/
municipality
Mix
+ Quant
++ Qual
21% paid informal patient payments for maternity services. 
Quasi-formal payments (payments organized by the 
facilities in the absence of government regulations) are 
charged for standard services that should be provided 
for free. Recipients of informal patient payments are 
obstetricians, anesthesiologists, midwives or nurses. 
Informal patient payments are given to secure obstetricians’ 
presence during childbirth, better quality of care, and 
the timely application of epidural analgesia. The highest 
amount of reported informal patient payment is 500 Euro.
Almost 90% of bribers continue to experience 
inconveniences during stay in hospital. 
Some did not report bribes but indicated 
having special connections to ensure better 
treatment and care. Women with connections 
report fewer inconveniences than those who 
have paid informally.
(4) Avdyli, 
2010 KOS 39
Perception of how 
informal patient 
payments affect the 
quality of and access to 
healthcare
Patient and 
providers, 
District/
municip.
Qual +
Informal patient payments are accepted due to poor 
healthcare system governance. They are necessary to 
receive care or better quality care or are given in gratitude 
or to maintain a positive relationship. Some providers do 
not receive informal patient payments for fear of getting 
caught, for ethical reasons or because they choose to work 
in public and private clinics to earn more money.
Informal patient payments are used to 
support further education of doctors, increase 
living standards, increase professional growth, 
maintain a professional level of care, act as 
counter-favors between doctor and patient, 
and increase happiness among the staff.
Providers suggest a performance-
based system of payments or 
legalization of informal patient 
payments
(5) 
Bredenkamp, 
2011
ALB
BH
KOS
MON
SER
49 848
The effects of health-
related expenditures 
on household welfare
General pop. 
multiple 
country
Quant +
Informal patient payments are substantial in all countries, 
but particularly high in Albania. They represent a large 
share of total health expenditure, often among the poor. 
In Albania, the poorest households pay higher health 
expenditures in informal patient payments than the richer 
quintiles. In Serbia, the rich pay a slightly greater share 
of health expenditure in informal patient payments than 
poorer. In Kosovo, expenditure shares are almost the same 
across quintiles.
Table. Summary of the Findings
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(6) Budak and 
Rajh, 2012
CRO 3005 Underreporting of 
corruption
General pop. 
single country
Quant +
92% of the 14% within the study population with corruption 
experiences claimed gifts to providers, mostly voluntary. 
Few reported corruption experiences formally as they 
gained benefits from the bribe, believed nothing useful 
would come from reporting, or had given a gratitude gift. 
People reporting corruption was perceived as likely to 
regret it.
(7) Vian and 
Burak, 2006
ALB 222
Intentions, past 
behaviours, attitudes 
and beliefs about 
informal patient 
payments in 
government health 
facilities
General pop. 
Cities/towns
Quant ++
No significant demographic difference was found among 
people intending to make informal patient payment vs. 
those that did not. Intenders were more positive in attitude 
and consequences of informal patient payments than non-
intenders. The practice was believed unethical and illegal 
but did not influence people’s intention. Informal patient 
payments were beneficial and were necessary to obtain 
quicker and better care or medical attention. Intenders are 
more likely to believe they will get faster and better quality 
care than non-intenders, but they also believe that they 
must pay to receive any care at all.
People not intending to pay informally more 
often report having connections with medical 
personnel.
(8) Vian et al, 
2006 ALB
131
Help health planners 
to understand informal 
patient payments in 
government health 
facilities
General pop. 
and providers, 
Districts/
municipalities
Qual +
Factors promoting informal patient payments are perceived 
low salaries of health staff, a belief that good health is 
worth any price, to obtain care or better service, security or 
fear of being denied treatment, lack of social connections, 
and the custom of gratitude gifts. For one person, payments 
for healthcare are reported up to 50 000 Albanian LEK 
(approx. 380 Euro) per transaction.
Informal patient payments create 
uncertainties and anxiety during the care-
seeking process, harm providers’ professional 
reputation, induce unnecessary medical 
interventions, and create discontinuity of care 
or better patient-provider relationships.
(9) Colombini 
et al, 2012
ALB
MAC
58
Access of Romani in S-E 
Europe to sexual and 
reproductive health 
services
Roma people, 
Cities/towns
Qual ++
Romani’s report paying up to 11 000 FYR Macedonian MKD 
(approx. 177 Euro) per transaction for one person, while 
also paying for care despite having health insurance.
(10) Tomini 
and Maarse, 
2011
ALB 17 302
How patients’ 
characteristics 
influence informal 
patient payments for 
in- and outpatient care
General pop. 
single country
Quant +
Informal patient payments for healthcare services are 
widespread in in- and outpatient care and are dependent 
on certain characteristics of patients, including age, area of 
residence, education, health status, and health insurance. 
These payments are less dependent on income. Payments 
are higher in inpatient care than in outpatient care. Patients 
paid either voluntarily or because they were requested to.
Patients with chronic illnesses, the lower 
educated, or rural residents were more likely 
requested to pay informally to medical staff.
Table. Continued
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(11) EBRD, 
2011
ALB
BH
CRO
KOS
MAC
MON
SER
Not clear
How transition is 
affecting the lives of 
people in CEE, SEE, 
the Baltics, CIS and 
Mongolia
General pop. 
multiple 
country
Quant ++
Informal patient payments to public health officials 
were made mostly because they were asked to or it was 
necessary. To a lesser extent, gratitude gifts to doctors 
were given. The highest reported incidents of informal 
patient payments were reported in Albania with 39% of 
respondents reporting making such payments.
Lacking drugs in healthcare reduces the 
satisfaction in services. The likelihood that 
patients are asked to or voluntarily bring 
pharmaceuticals increases.
(12) UNDOC, 
2011
ALB
BH,
CRO
KOS
MAC
MON
SER
28 066
people
Gain knowledge 
about and learn from 
people’s experiences 
with corruption in the 
Western Balkans
General pop. 
multiple 
country
Quant ++
On average, one in six citizens of the region experiences 
bribery with a public official annually, and 12% of citizens 
pay at least one bribe. Corruption in the general public 
sector is mostly in rural areas and cash payments account 
for two-thirds of all bribes. The average bribe across the 
region is 257 EUR and as high as 1000 Euro. Bribes are 
paid in response to a direct or indirect request, offered 
voluntarily, or to receive better treatment at the doctor.
The average number of bribes paid is higher 
among lower income groups than wealthier 
citizens. No social group is exempt from 
bribery.
(13) 
Grødeland, 
2013
SER
KOS
MAC
1900
Public perception of 
corruption, types of 
corruption, institutions 
responsible for anti-
corruption reform and 
anti-corruption efforts
General pop. 
multiple 
country
Mix
+
Quan ++ 
Qual
Small gifts or amounts of cash are reported. Payments were 
perceived as corruption, due to socialism or transition, 
to be necessary or a custom (gratitude), to get access or 
quicker access to healthcare services, for physical comfort, 
or to supplement salary of providers. Respondents were 
asked or volunteered to bring or buy goods for healthcare 
services supposed to be provided for free. Informal patient 
payments were max. 50 EUR but bought and brought goods 
were more than 1000 EUR per transaction for one person.
Informal patient payments were avoided 
in informal networks (People who are able 
and willing to help each other, providing 
information access to other people or 
assistance) between doctors and patients and 
payments were typically in vulnerable groups.
Study participants suggest to 
change mentality; use organized 
religion to indicate morality 
and reduce informal patient 
payments; prosecuting and 
sentencing corrupt politicians, 
government officials and 
others engaging in corruption; 
strengthen powers of institutions 
fighting corruption; and 
introducing new anti-corruption 
legislation. Measures would 
be successful with political 
will, stricter laws and law 
enforcement, higher living 
standards or use of force.
(14) Hotchkiss 
et al, 2005
ALB 2000 HH
Understand the 
magnitude and 
distribution of OOP 
payments and identify 
factors why and how 
much people pay
General pop. 
Cities/towns 
and districts/
municipalities
Quant ++
45% of those requiring hospitalization reported extra fees 
for provider services and 61% report making gift payments. 
44% of those using outpatient services for acute health 
problems reported paying (unofficial) consultation fees and 
25% providing gifts. Gifts were mostly voluntary.
Cost of services was a reason for not using 
healthcare. Of patients with acute health 
problems, the poor were more likely to pay 
for consultations, but were less likely to make 
gift payments than better off clients. Clients of 
polyclinics and hospitals paid OOP payments 
more frequently than clients of PHCs and 
ambulances. Rural residents paid more 
frequently for consultations. Socio-economic 
status did not affect paying informally.
Table. Continued
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(15) Janevic 
et al, 2011
MAC
SER
90
Develop a conceptual 
framework showing 
how levels of racism 
affects access to 
maternal healthcare in 
Romani women
Roma women, 
gynecologists, 
NGOs 
and state 
institutions, 
cities
Qual ++
Informal patient payments were cited in all focus groups 
and social connections were believed to give access to 
better quality service. The ability to make informal patient 
payments or contribute gifts influenced the quality of 
service and level of negligent behavior toward Romani 
women.
The perceived or actual need to pay bribes 
reduced the likelihood of seeking maternal 
healthcare.
(16) Krupic et 
al, 2015
BH 21
How immigrants and 
refugees experience 
different institutions 
and the health system
Refugees, 
cities/
towns
Qual ++ Informal patient payments were given to receive access to 
care or to receive better care.
(17) Uka, 
2013 KOS
29 Perceptions of informal 
patient payments
Patients and 
providers
Qual +
IP are a result of culture and custom rather than socio-
economic conditions. Payments vary by level of healthcare, 
department, urgency of treatment, and patients’ attitude 
towards informal patient payments. Seventy percent 
of patients had offered informal patient payments for 
themselves or for a family member. Most doctors denied 
receiving IP. IP was most prevalent in surgery, gynecology 
and obstetrics. Patients pay to receive better care and 
subsidized drugs, to skip the queue, for a preferable doctor, 
and/or to express gratitude.
(18) Radin, 
2013 CRO
2300
Assess the relationship 
between corruption 
and trust in public 
healthcare
General pop. 
single country
Quant ++
Corruption has negative effects on trust in 
public healthcare in the 2007 survey but 
not in the 2009 survey. Perceptions of and 
experience with corruption is negatively 
correlated with choice of public healthcare 
facilities, suggesting lower trust in public care 
providers. Patients are more willing to provide 
drugs to healthcare when there are shortages 
of medicine.
(19) RCC, 
2015
ALB, BH, 
CRO, 
KOS, 
MAC, 
MON, 
SER
7000
Examine public opinion 
on various topics 
covered in the five 
pillars of the SEE 2020 
Strategy
General pop. 
multiple 
country
Quant ++
Respondents believe that giving or taking bribes is 
widespread in people working in the public health sector 
in Croatia (17%), Serbia (38%), Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(28%), FYROM (23%), Kosovo (13%), Albania (24%) and 
Montenegro (30%).
Table. Continued
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(20) Tomini et 
al, 2013 ALB
10 840
people
Analyse how much 
OOP health spending 
impoverishes 
households
General pop. 
single country
Quant +
There is lack of clarity between formal and informal patient 
payments in Albania. The amount of informal patient 
payments per capita has increased substantially over the 
years, from 220 (1,6 Euro) ALL in 2002 to 384 (2,8 Euro) ALL 
in 2008 on average per transaction for one person.
The amount paid informally by the lowest 
quintile increased almost five times over 
the years, while there was a more moderate 
increase in the higher quintiles over the same 
period. On average, the poorest households 
had relatively less budget than the rich but 
faced higher OOP payments.
(21) Tomini, 
2007 ALB
7973
People
and
1782
HH
Identify determinants 
of informal patient 
payments in healthcare
General pop. 
single country
Quant ++
There are differences between the determinants of informal 
patient payments in inpatient and outpatient care. For 
example there are reasons to believe that if services of 
inpatient sector are purchased by health insurance we may 
observe less informal patient payments.
If services of the inpatient sector are 
purchased by health insurance there may be 
less informal patient payments (at least for 
some categories). Other determinants were 
higher level of incomes, positive health rating, 
lower level of education, and services offered 
by public providers.
(22) Tomini et 
al, 2012a ALB
7238
HH
Intra-household 
differences in spending 
on informal patient 
payments
General pop. 
single country
Quant ++
There are no significant differences between household 
members’ incidence of informal patient payments, but 
there are more differences in the amount paid informally. 
Thus, households strategically favor individuals with higher 
earning potential (human capital).
(23) Tomini et 
al, 2012b
ALB 7238HH
Measure the amounts 
of informal patient 
payments
General pop. 
single country
Quant +
Medical staff has less information on patients’ maximum 
willingness to pay informally than patients have on medical 
staff’s minimum expected amount.
Informal patient payments are characterized 
by rural residents paying lower amounts; 
household size is negatively related to the 
amount paid; older individuals pay smaller 
amounts in inpatient care; patients are 
either asked or expected to pay informally; 
higher educated or patients married or living 
together pay higher amounts informally; and 
health insurance decreases the amount paid 
informally.
(24) Tomini 
and Groot, 
2013
ALB 10 839HH
Explore the demand 
side of informal patient 
payments in in- and 
outpatient care
General pop. 
single country
Quant ++
Incidents of informal patient payments are 
highest among rural residents; lower educated 
patients; those with difficulties paying for 
healthcare; patients with less information 
on the amount required, patients with fewer 
social connections. Having national health 
insurance lowers the probability of paying 
informally both for outpatient and inpatient 
care.
Abbreviations: HH, households; OOP, out-of-pocket; PHC, primary healthcare; NGOs, non-governmental organizations.
Table. Continued
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studies (#1,#2,#4,#6,#7,#8,#10,#11,#12,#13,#14,#15,#21) 
examined both gifts and cash, dividing their data into these 
two categories. Other studies (#5,#9,#17,#20,#22,#23,#24) 
combined voluntary and forced gifts and cash payments and 
used the general term ‘informal payments’ to describe and 
analyse their data. Only two studies (#1,#2) explicitly studied 
bought and brought goods.
What the Data Reveal About Informal Patient Payments and 
Bought and Brought Goods
The reviewed papers revealed a variety of descriptive data 
on the phenomenon of informal patient payments. However, 
limited data were found regarding the specific issue of bought 
and brought goods. In the remainder of this study, bought and 
brought goods will be referred to only when data are available. 
The numbers in brackets in the text below refer to the number 
of included papers. The main findings (what is known, the 
perceived effects on healthcare and the perceived remedies 
for the practice of informal patient payments) are collected 
in the Table. 
The reviewed studies will be referred to in brackets, marking 
their number from #1 to #24. Complete list of included studies 
may be found in the Appendix 1, separate from the reference 
list. 
Incidents of Payments for Healthcare in the Western Balkans
The results showed that ‘incidents of informal patient 
payments’ as an overall aim were studied most often. Few 
studies divided these payments into cash payments and gifts, 
thus providing only a limited picture of these payments. 
Quantitative studies and some qualitative studies reported 
the incidents in percentages, whereas other qualitative studies 
identified narratives. Quantitative findings on incidents 
were divided into percentages of respondents in the studies 
who reported informal patient payments (gifts, bought and 
brought goods or informal patient payments in general) 
or into percentages of annual household and per capita 
healthcare expenditures measured in terms of informal patient 
payments. In this regard, the respondents in the included 
studies reported making informal patient payments from 4% 
up to 91% of the time, which indicates a great diversity in the 
reporting. Out of the 24 studies, 15 identified incidents of 
informal patient payments in all sectors of healthcare, while 
eight divided their data into outpatient and inpatient care. 
In the 15 studies, the incidents of informal patient payments 
most commonly took place in outpatient care. Two studies 
(#20,#5) in the review describe overall per capita expenditures 
on formal payments, including bought and brought goods. 
These data are not included in this study because it is unclear 
whether the described goods are legitimate or illegitimate or 
both. 
The limited data that are available on bought and brought 
goods is illustrative in that these goods were reported in the 
studies in less than 1% of the study population (in Serbia 
and Kosovo) and as high as 90% of the study population (in 
Albania). These data are uncertain because the term bought 
and brought goods is not specifically used to describe all of 
these transactions. However, researchers indicate that such 
payments are illegitimate and that healthcare is supposed to 
be provided to patients for free. In addition, some of the data 
were not included for the following reason, eg, one study (#12) 
reports “other goods” to be paid by patients, although it is 
uncertain what is included in that category. Nonetheless, two 
Serbian studies (#1,#2) examine the illegitimacy of bought 
and brought goods in inpatient and outpatient care, and 
they report as high as two-thirds of their study population 
bringing or buying these goods in healthcare although 
healthcare services are supposed to be provided for free. 
Further, respondents in two of the qualitative studies (#4,#13) 
reported that they had to bring goods to the hospital when 
they were being treated. 
Informal patient payments were widely reported in 
Albania. Within the entire healthcare system, the Albanian 
respondents reported paying informally between 19% and 
91% (#7,#11,#12) of the time. The corresponding figures in 
Serbia were between 7% and 23% (#3,#11,#12), 7% and 70% in 
Kosovo (#5,#12,#17), up to 17% in Croatia (#11,12), between 
5% and 22% in Bosnia and Herzegovina (#11,#12), between 
8% and 13% in Montenegro (#11,#12) and between 4% and 
13% in FYROM (#11,#12). The respondents in seven studies 
(#4,#8,#9,#13,#15,#16,#17) qualitatively explained their 
experiences with informal patient payments, eg, that they 
had been asked or had volunteered to make informal patient 
payments. The Balkan Barometer Study (#19) found that up 
to nearly 40% of the respondents in each Western Balkan 
country believed that practices of giving or taking bribes or 
abusing positions of power for personal gain are widespread 
among public health officials. 
Paying Informally in Inpatient and Outpatient Care
Some studies typically divide their data on informal patient 
payments into inpatient and outpatient care. In Albania’s 
inpatient care, informal patient payments were reported by 
60% of the respondents (#24). In Serbia the corresponding 
number is 19% (#1). Moreover, seven qualitative studies 
(#4,#8,#9,#13,#15,#16,#17) identify respondents as having 
to pay informally to receive (better) healthcare at hospitals. 
With regard to Albanian outpatient care, 28% (#24) of the 
respondents report making an informal patient payment, 
whereas in Serbia it is only approximately 2% (#1). Dividing 
these payments into gifts (ie, food, drinks, jewelry) in inpatient 
and outpatient care, the gifts are reported in up to 11% of the 
respondents in Serbian outpatient care (#1) and in 28% of 
Albanian outpatient care (#21). In inpatient care, the largest 
percentage of respondents who report gift giving (ie, food, 
drinks, jewelry) is 46% in Serbia (#2) and 61% in Albania 
(#14). The incidents of cash payments in healthcare are poorly 
reported in the quantitative studies. In one Serbian study (#1), 
less than 1% of the respondents reported informally paying 
cash in outpatient care and up to 3% (#2) in inpatient care. A 
survey study of all Western Balkan countries (#12) examined 
the forms of payments to all public officials and found that 
there is substantial difference between countries in terms of 
either paying in cash or providing food and drinks or other 
goods. In this study, cash nevertheless appears to be the most 
common form of bribery in two-thirds of all bribery cases. 
The Forms and Amounts Paid for Healthcare Services and 
Goods in the Western Balkans
Different methods were used to report the amounts of 
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informal patient payments and bought and brought goods. 
In this study, only data that involve the paid amount (not 
percentages) are included because qualitative studies 
frequently provide narratives of these amounts.
Most commonly and particularly in Albania 
(#8,#10,#12,#14,#20,#22,#24), the respondents described 
informally paying up to 50 Euro in cash for healthcare 
services. Studies from Kosovo (#4), Serbia (#3) and one from 
all the Western Balkan countries (#12) found respondents 
paying as much as 500 Euro for healthcare services. The latter 
study (#12) also reported payments over 1000 Euro. Only 
two studies on Kosovo (#4), Serbia and FYROM (#13) found 
a description of the size of gifts that were given by patients. 
Small gifts were given mostly in gratitude, and large gifts, 
such as a hotel stays, were given in reciprocation for services 
such as free services at an automobile mechanic. The papers 
typically use the term “gifts” as an overall synonym for favors 
and gratuities.
A distinction should be made in the matter of paying 
informally for services or goods. Though the amounts that are 
paid for bought and brought goods are only described in two 
studies from Serbia, two from Albania and one from FYROM. 
The respondents from Serbia and Albania reported frequently 
paying up to 50 Euro for goods (ie, epidural or other medicine) 
(#2,#14,#20). Another study from Serbia (#3) found patients 
paying between 100 and 200 Euro for an epidural in maternity 
care, whereas in FYROM (#13) a respondent paid more than 
1000 Euro for medicine that was supposed to be provided free 
of charge by the hospital. 
The methods for measuring the amounts of informal patient 
payments varied across studies, and a comparison between 
studies is thus therefore not relevant because it merely 
provides an overall picture of the informal amounts that are 
paid for healthcare in the Western Balkans. 
Drivers of Informal Patient Payments
Cultural Perceptions or Necessary Payments 
The review revealed a picture of patients who wanted to 
express their gratitude to providers, whereas others felt 
that it was an obligation to pay for qualified service. In 
14 studies, which cover all the Western Balkan countries, 
providers asked patients to pay for healthcare services. 
However, in nine studies, which also cover all the countries, 
the patients volunteered to pay cash or give gifts in either 
gratitude or out of fear of not receiving quality service. Most 
studies identify both patients and providers as initiators. 
Though, a great driver in all the countries to pay informally 
for healthcare was to express gratitude, which was mostly 
reported in Kosovo and Albania followed by Serbia, FYROM 
and Croatia (#4,#6,#8,#11,#12,#13,#17,#21). In six of the 
studies, the respondents also argued that informal patient 
payments were a custom (#4,#6,#8,#11,#13,#17) in that it 
was a gesture to thank the doctors. Conversely, five studies 
(#6,#7,#13,#15,#16) found that the respondents considered 
informal patient payments to be corruption. In the end, paying 
to receive access to or better quality healthcare services was 
found in all seven countries. Patients paying to gain access 
to health services were mostly reported in Serbia, Albania 
and FYROM (#3,#7,#8,#9,#11,#13,#14,#15), whereas paying 
to receive higher quality care was mostly reported in Serbia 
and Albania (#3,#7,8,#12,#14,#15). Another issue was being 
asked or volunteering to buy goods in exchange for healthcare 
services. For example, in one study (#3), a patient was asked 
to pay for an epidural analgesia in connection with childbirth. 
These studies were mostly from Serbia but these practices 
were also found, albeit to a lesser extent, in Albania, FYROM 
and Kosovo (#1,#2,#3,#13,#14,#17,#20). 
It seems ambiguous as to whether patients pay to express 
gratitude or out of fear of receiving low quality care. However, 
a quantitative study of Albania (#23) found that the share of 
patients being requested or expected to pay informally was 
larger than those who paid voluntarily. Additionally, eight 
other studies in this review, from Serbia, Albania, FYROM, 
Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, found that patients 
either gave a gift or gave cash to providers for their own 
psychological comfort (#3,#7,#8,#13,#14) or to supplement 
the doctors’ salary (#4,#8,#13,#16,#17). It is therefore difficult 
to argue that customary gifts and cash payments for gratitude 
to providers should remain in the system because in many 
cases they are required.
The review further identified informal patient payments that 
were given for transportation (#4,#14) or to receive treatment 
from a specific doctor (#4,#17). Moreover, in two studies 
from Kosovo and Albania (#4,#8), providers also described 
accepting payments to avoid insulting patients.
The Determinants of Paying Informally 
Nearly all the studies – including studies from every country 
– described who is most likely to make informal patient 
payments. Only two studies examined who pays in bought 
and brought goods (#1,#2). The most common determinants 
that were studied included economic status, level of education, 
residency, age and belonging to a vulnerable group. Despite 
the comprehensive evidence, a review of the combined data 
set reveals that there is no definite indication of who in society 
pays the most. The contradictory data may be illustrated 
in that higher education was recognized in several studies 
(#10,#21,#22,#24) as a means of avoiding paying informally for 
care. It was however also found that higher educated patients 
were more likely to make informal patient payments (#1,#21) 
or to pay higher amounts in their informal patient payments 
(#1,#22,#23,#24). Dividing the data into countries, there is no 
apparent pattern. Often, only one study is conducted in an 
individual country, eg, in Serbia only one study (#1) identified 
that well-educated patients were more likely to make informal 
patient payments. Because the data are also thin in Kosovo, 
FYROM, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, 
it is difficult to draw clear conclusions. Nevertheless evidence 
from seven studies from Albania (#8,#10,#12,#14,#21,#22,#24) 
indicates that rural residents pay more frequently than urban 
residents (#23,#24). Poorer groups in Albania were also found 
to pay more often than others (#5,#8,#20,#21,#24). However, 
richer populations have also been found to be more likely to 
pay informally (#8,#23,#24). In Serbia and FYROM, studies 
found vulnerable groups (ie, unemployed, poorer, elderly, 
Roma, immigrants) to be more likely to make informal 
patient payments (#2,#9,#13,#15), whereas in the other five 
countries there was either no or little evidence regarding 
this issue. The review further identified respondents making 
informal patient payments despite having health insurance 
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(#4,#9,#14,#23), which indicates that insurance is not always 
helpful in reducing such payments.
The Effects of Informal Patient Payments 
Most studies in the review described the effects that informal 
patient payments or bought and brought goods had on 
patients within the broader context of the healthcare system 
(Table). For example as discussed in the previous section, in 
some cases, vulnerable groups pay more often than others. 
These groups include people with poor social connections in 
healthcare, poorer populations and rural residents. According 
to the findings on bought and brought goods, a shortage of 
pharmaceuticals was found to reduce satisfaction in health 
services and to increase the likelihood that patients would 
either bring or be asked to bring such offerings when they 
undergo treatment (#11,#18). One Serbian study (#3) further 
found that patients continued to experience inconveniences 
or were dissatisfied with services after having paid informally, 
although patients who had social connections reported 
fewer such inconveniences. Another study (#8) found that 
patients expressed uncertainties and anxiety when seeking 
healthcare due to informal patient payments. In the same 
study, the patients believed that paying informally harmed 
the professional reputation of doctors, induced unnecessary 
medical interventions and led to discontinuity in care. 
However, informal patient payments were found to yield 
happier staff (#4) and better relationships between patients 
and providers (#4,#8). Doctors who benefit from informal 
patient payments also used such payments to further enhance 
their professional or private lives, eg, through education, 
travel, conferences or higher living standards (#4).
Perceptions Regarding Remedies to Fight Informal Patient 
Payments in Healthcare
Despite attempts to tackle informal patient payments and 
corruption in the Western Balkan countries, researchers 
believe that efforts appear to be limited.39 One Albanian study 
in the review (#20) found that informal patient payments have 
increased over the years despite anti-corruption strategies, 
which may be due (at least in part) to the quality and 
implementation of these types of payments (#13). It seems 
that a large majority of people in southeastern Europe have 
never been involved in the consultation process in which the 
government enacts legislation or engages in decision making 
(#19). Other studies in the review also address governments’ 
lack of will as an explanation for the preservation of informal 
patient payments. For example, a study on Serbian maternity 
care (#3) found a discrepancy between official and hospital 
guidelines, which led to quasi-formal charges to standard 
services. Several other studies (eg, #7,#8,#11,#12,#13,#16,#17) 
illustrated that reasons for respondents to make informal 
patient payments to healthcare staff was the poor adherence to 
law by both citizens and government officials and the lack of 
governmental effort to increase salaries and generally increase 
funding for healthcare. Therefore, informal patient payments 
were used by some doctors in Kosovo to attend courses or 
professional conferences and meetings (#4). Moreover, several 
studies (eg, #4,#8,#17) found that informal patient payments 
were mostly provided in hospitals to experienced doctors or 
within the most common areas of specialized medicine, eg, 
different surgery areas, radiology and maternity care. When 
respondents were asked about reporting illegal payments, 
they indicated that no actions were taken by the responsible 
institutions in response to such reporting and that the 
respondents additionally benefitted from these payments and 
therefore could not rationalize the reporting (#6,#12).
Exempting vulnerable groups from paying for healthcare 
services has been discussed in most studies, which indicates 
that policies on the issue appeared to have limited effect, as 
more than half the studies found vulnerable persons making 
informal patient payments or providing bought and brought 
goods (eg, #2,#5,#9,#14,#24).
Only three of the reviewed studies identified positive aspects 
of informal patient payments and perceptions of the initiatives 
that would reduce these payments. For example, in Kosovo 
(#4), some nurses shared such payments in a common box to 
be divided among them. To reduce informal patient payments, 
some providers in Kosovo suggested a performance-based 
system of payments or legalizing informal patient payments 
such that patients with more resources could receive better 
quality care (#4). On the other hand, some respondents 
from FYROM and Serbia believed that reporting should be 
improved and that the mentality of accepting informal patient 
payments should be changed (#13). To this end, some doctors 
would not accept informal patient payments due to ethical 
considerations (#4) or the fear of getting caught (#4,#13), 
whereas other doctors chose to work in both public and 
private clinics to earn more money (#4).
A few of the Albanian respondents believed that religious 
organizations might be used as a morality indicator to reduce 
informal patient payments, although this was only a minority 
of the respondents (#13). In the same study, the respondents 
indicated that the EU should exert pressure on the respective 
states to reduce corruption and that anti-corruption initiatives 
should be mainly addressed through the media, as it was most 
effective forum. In terms of effective initiatives, another study 
(#24) found a decrease in informal patient payments over 
the examined years, but it was unknown what measures were 
taken and why they may have worked. Only one reviewed 
study (#13) found measures that stand out in terms of 
respondents’ perceived effectiveness at reducing corruption: 
Prosecuting and sentencing corrupt high-ranking politicians, 
government officials and others who have engaged in corrupt 
behavior, strengthening the powers of legal and other 
institutions that fight corruption, and introducing new anti-
corruption legislation. The respondents believed that these 
measures would only be successful with political will, stricter 
laws and law enforcement, higher living standards and/or the 
use of force.
Discussion
In the review, we identified quantitative and qualitative 
studies in all the Western Balkan countries, combined with a 
variety of different respondents at the country-, city- and/or 
municipality-levels. The number of studies increased between 
2002 and 2015, and most of the studies were conducted 
in recent years. In spite of the comprehensive evidence 
documenting incidents involving informal patient payments, 
it was clear that evidence was fragmented with cases of 
informal patient payments being reported on a wide scale 
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across studies. In addition, evidence regarding which groups 
of society mostly pay for care was inconsistent and showed 
no obvious pattern. Findings of this nature may be attributed 
to the wide variety of areas and populations that are studied 
in the review, leading to an indecipherable pattern. On that 
account, similar findings were identified in a study from 
Nigeria, showing that no socio-economic group was exempt 
from paying informally. Neither urban nor rural residents were 
more exposed than the other.40 It may also illustrate a culture 
and a custom of gratuity and reciprocity in these countries. As 
the Western Balkan countries are processing to enter the EU, 
such potential customary practice warrants attention from 
decision makers. Measures primarily addressing healthcare 
access may thus not be successful if not tackling behavioral 
change as well. Stepurko and colleagues41 argue that a sensitive 
topic such as informal patient payments is difficult to estimate 
in terms of magnitude and real scope and, in particular, in 
terms of the frequency of occurrence. However, in this 
review, the value of informal patient payments to healthcare 
providers was more consistent, typically between 1-50 Euro, 
although some of the respondents also made informal patient 
payments as high as 1000 Euro for healthcare services. It is 
unknown what amounts of money are common in paying for 
care, as evidence on this matter is sparse. Further research in 
the area is required.
Both the quantitative and qualitative studies reported 
informal patient payments for inpatient care and to providers 
in common areas of specialized medicine, in particular. These 
findings are in line with the Living Standard Measurement 
Survey of the World Bank42 and studies from other Eastern 
European countries.3,43-45 
Evidence of bought and brought goods was limited to only 
two studies that specifically examined this issue. Other 
studies included narratives from respondents on the issue, 
although much of the data were unclear because bought and 
brought goods were not specifically addressed or discussed. 
A limitation to our study is therefore the collection of data by 
others, which makes it difficult to assess whether the goods 
were legitimate or illegitimate. The data included on bought 
and brought goods were therefore included only in those 
cases in which researchers indicated their illegitimacy. Two 
of the reviewed studies (#11,#18) found that the absence of 
pharmaceuticals reduced the satisfaction with health services 
and increased the likelihood that patients would either bring 
or be asked to bring such payments themselves. In previous 
studies from the southern and eastern European area, the 
findings also illustrate contributions of medicine, food, bed 
linens or other materials that are supposed to be provided 
by the hospital during treatment.46-48 The practice of patient 
responsibility for bought and brought goods appears to have 
existed for many years, although this practice has not received 
the proper focus by decision makers and researchers in the 
Western Balkan countries. This review has provided greater 
knowledge of the existing literature available on bought and 
brought goods. Though further research should attempt to 
clarify the structure and cases of bringing and buying goods 
in the process of seeking healthcare in the Western Balkans 
because such practice appears to be unexplored. As with 
informal patient payments, bought and brought goods also 
appear to stem from a poorly governed healthcare system in 
which people apply a “do-it-yourself ” approach. This type 
of approach is also referred to as alternative politics, where 
people are dissatisfied with the current government policy and 
consequently initiate their own actions. In this case, they bring 
and buy goods when they seek healthcare to ensure the quality 
of treatment.49 Lerberghe et al50 study the consequences of a 
poor working environment, such as underpaid staff and/or 
the lack of materials and medicine. These authors claim that 
corruption is a coping strategy for health providers to address 
unsatisfactory working or living conditions. Regulations and 
salary increases are not enough to tackle this problem, as 
professionals’ value systems and a pressure from users and 
peers is also necessary. A combination of these measures 
would most likely succeed in reducing corruption.50
The present review attempted to identify measures that 
might reduce informal patient payments. It was clear that 
few studies of the Western Balkan countries examined the 
reasons for effective or ineffective measures. However, some 
respondents in the review did contemplate measures that 
would reduce informal patient payments, and they found 
that legalizing informal patient payments and introducing 
performance-based systems of payments, strengthening 
reporting, changing mentalities, and involving the media, 
and/or including the EU or religious organizations in any 
prospective solution would help to reduce informal patient 
payments. Furthermore, respondents from one study in 
the review claimed that different judicial and regulatory 
measures would be successful. A successful strategy to 
reduce such payments appears to include both harder and 
softer measures, such as that suggested by Miller and Vian,51 
which included legislative, judicial, political and financial 
restructuring and behavioral changes in the public. Together 
with Gaal and colleagues,52 these authors claim that a context-
specific strategy is important, including an assessment of 
the motivators of patients and providers, the structure of the 
healthcare financing and delivery system, and the resources 
available. Especially considering behavioral change among 
the public was learned in Taiwan, where the cultural beliefs 
among patients and providers did not change when securing 
better access to healthcare and reducing informal payments.53 
If not tackling informal patient payments and bought and 
brought goods properly, patients may choose to insure 
themselves outside the public healthcare system, obtaining 
private health insurances. In such cases, healthcare access 
will become unequal, since only wealthier population groups 
will have this opportunity. Gaal et al52 found that success 
stories involving efficient strategies to reduce informal 
patient payments are rare due to the complexity of the 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, they emphasize the importance 
of stable and adequate (public) funding for healthcare and 
comprehensive and well-sequenced policy instruments 
to tackle informal patient payments.52 It may therefore be 
questioned whether inadequate funding and financial cuts 
in public healthcare facilitates the informal payments and 
bought and brought goods in Western Balkan countries. 
To our knowledge, only limited evidence-based research is 
available on the effectiveness of initiatives to combat informal 
patient payments in the Western Balkan countries, and future 
research would benefit from such studies. The present study 
was a review of the perceived initiatives to tackle informal 
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patient payments, excluding literature studies and potential 
policy or legislative analyses that could have highlighted this 
issue in more detail. However, no studies in the present review 
examined assessments of the effectiveness of measures from 
the perspectives of politicians or civil servants who work to 
implement informal patient payment reforms.
Considerations Regarding Methodological Limitations and 
Confidence in Findings
Scoping review methodologies have been well described 
in the literature by several researchers, who have enhanced 
and clarified the methodology. However, unresolved matters 
persist, such as reaching a common and accepted definition 
and purpose(s) of scoping studies and development of the 
methodological rigor that is required to assess scoping 
review quality. Moreover, to point out unresolved matters 
or issues that needs further focus in a literature review, the 
completeness of data by other researchers is necessary. Data 
is also often collected with another focus in mind than that of 
the review, ie, not only including Western Balkan countries or 
focusing on informal patient payments. Consequently some 
knowledge might not have been reported in the studies of the 
present review. Furthermore, in the search strategy evidence 
addressing the effectiveness of studies was not considered 
inclusion criteria. Some studies may therefore have been 
missed. The final point of consulting stakeholders in the 
scoping review methodology could have been a valuable tool 
to validate the findings, though this stage was not feasible 
for this review. The present scoping review was nevertheless 
conducted in a comprehensive manner that included the 
CERQual assessment tool to assess the evidence. Because 
the tool looks at combined findings across studies, it was 
possible to assess whether the data were consistent, whether 
the research was studied in various contexts and how much 
data were available. 
The findings of this review were mostly graded either 
of moderate confidence or of very low confidence. High 
confidence in evidence is generally rare because studies 
frequently reveal their own limitations. In our assessment, 
many of the findings lacked adequacy, coherence or had 
methodological  limitations.
The CERQual assessment recognized a moderate confidence 
in the evidence with regard to the findings on the incidents 
of informal patient payments, the attitudes towards informal 
patient payments and the types of informal patient payments 
(eg, payments made based on gratitude, low salaries, and limited 
access). The evidence was widely studied in all the Western 
Balkan countries, although some countries (such as Albania 
and Serbia) were studied more than others, making it difficult 
to generalize the results in some countries. Most of the studies 
were although consistent in terms of study population and 
setting by including the countries’ representable populations 
and relatively unbiased data. Nonetheless, the data outcomes 
on incidents were not highly consistent across the studies, 
although the data were reasonably consistent with regard to 
attitudes towards and types of informal patient payments. 
These data could therefore be assessed with confidence and 
provide a reasonable representation of incidents of informal 
patient payments and of Western Balkan peoples’ perceptions 
of informal patient payments and their reasons for giving or 
taking them. 
Low evidentiary confidence was found regarding the 
magnitude of informal patient payments. Data on these 
amounts were somewhat consistent, although with some 
outliers. The findings were however mostly from Serbia 
and Albania. In addition, quantitative studies were in some 
terms biased, eg, lacking reporting or concerns about lacking 
precision of association between variables, whereas the 
qualitative studies offered rich data but with methodological 
limitations, eg, lacking reporting of analysis. 
With regard to bought and brought goods, the types of such 
transactions (such as the lack of drugs, limited access), their 
magnitude and their incidence were rated very low, due to the 
lack of data on this subject, which influenced the consistency, 
adequacy and relevance of the evidence. Conclusions based 
on these data should therefore be handled with care, as it is 
uncertain whether the findings are substantially different 
from the actual phenomenon.
Considerations Regarding Implications for Policy and Research
Systematic reviews are often valued by policy makers and 
other civil servants due to the processual and systematical 
consideration of evidence that gives rise to an iterative 
exchange between the data collected. Our research 
demonstrates that the need for research and policy makers 
to address the phenomenon of patients paying informally for 
healthcare services or goods in Western Balkan. To further 
explore this topic, researcher should focus on would be 
valuable to consider the perspectives of politicians and other 
civil servants working in the field of implementing reforms 
on informal patient payments. The effectiveness of measures 
taken to reduce this informal practice may then be clarified 
further. The evidence presented in this paper may provide 
credible awareness towards the need for behavioral change 
and policies to address informal payments and bought and 
brought goods in healthcare.
Conclusion
In conducting this scoping review, it became apparent that 
countries such as Albania and Serbia were studied in more 
detail and more often than others. Both large-scale studies 
and smaller studies were included, yielding a broad picture 
of quantitative and qualitative data on the issue of concern, 
eg, that incidents of paying informally were not consistently 
reported across studies. Thus, there was no clear pattern of 
which patient groups that pay informally or whether payments 
are made out of gratitude or obligation. Both positive and 
negative effects were found, which suggests that vulnerable 
groups were more at risk of paying informally or that patients 
felt anxiety, uncertainty or dissatisfaction with services 
when they pay informally. The positive implications for 
healthcare services were happier staff, better patient-provider 
relationships and better living conditions. The phenomenon 
is complex because of the juxtaposition of gratitude payments 
versus obligatory payments. However, patients often felt the 
need to pay doctors who work in poor conditions with a lack 
of equipment and/or low salaries, to take their own actions 
towards poor government health policies. To clarify the policy 
measures taken towards the reduction of patients paying 
informally, it would be valuable to examine the topic of this 
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paper from the perspective of policy makers and other civil 
servants in the field of healthcare. It was also revealed that 
despite the lack of evidence on bought and brought goods, 
these seemed to be even more common than informal patient 
payments. In terms of effective strategies to reduce corruption, 
the review found that success might be achieved by changing 
mentalities and by including different institutions, such as the 
media or the EU. Although informal patient payments have 
been studied and described in several settings, there remains 
a dearth of research on the effectiveness of strategies in a 
Western Balkan setting. 
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Endnotes
[1] Is the % of publicly funded healthcare of the total health expenditure in 
a country. Total health expenditure is the sum of public and private health 
expenditure.
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